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Abstract
In the literature on cost-effectiveness analyses, there has recently been considerable debate on
the way of measuring the production gain caused by a new treatment as well as its proper evaluation.
In this paper, we propose a general framework for the discussion of such questions in the form of a
general equilibrium model with separate health variables. It is shown how the standard methods of
cost-effectiveness and cost-utility analysis are derived from basic assumptions. Also, the question
of whether to choose the human capital or the frictional method in evaluating production gains can
be given an answer in this model.
1. Introduction
In a recent paper by Olsen and Richardson (1999), the authors discuss the problems
connectedwith including production gains in a cost-effectiveness analysis. The production
gain from a medical treatment is societyÕs indirect beneÞt to the increased amount of work
supplied to society as a result of the patient being cured quicker than previously (this
production gain is considered as an indirect beneÞt in order to distinguish it from the
direct beneÞts of the treatment in form of increased health of the patients). In traditional
cost-effectiveness analyses, there has been a certain reluctance to include the production
gains, and in addition, there has been a controversy pertaining to the way of measuring the
production gain.
In Olsen and Richardson (1999) the production gain is discussed and methods of
evaluation are proposed. The approach of the authors, as outlined in their introduction,
consists in (1) determining the correct magnitude of the production gain, and (2) deciding
what should andwhat should not enter into a cost-effectiveness analysis, thus dividing their
theoretical analysis of the problem into a positive and a normative part. Consequently,
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the discussion splits into arguments about the correct way of measuring production gains
followed by a discussion of what ought to be taken into consideration when computing a
cost-effectiveness ratio.
The purpose of the present note is to argue that the search for a correct measurement
(in money terms) of the production gain is futile Ð there is no such thing. The production
gain is necessarily relative to an underlying criterion for social welfare; when this criterion
changes, the production gain will change its size as well. Therefore, the ÒpositiveÓ and
ÒnormativeÓ parts of the investigation cannot really be distinguished, and for both, ÒcorrectÓ
should be taken to mean ÒconsistentÓ, that is consistent with the given underlying criterion
for social welfare. The fact that this criterion is not known to the investigator and will
have to be assessed using other information, does not change the situation.
Unfortunately, this consistency approach to cost-effectiveness analyses has not been
given due attendance in the literature, where most authors Ð including the much cited
Washington Panel (see Gold e.a., 1996) Ð argue about the ÒrightÓ evaluation methods using
intuitive economic arguments but without reference to a common theoretical framework.
In the following section, we give a short presentation of the theoretical basis for
cost-effectiveness analysis, and we then use this background to consider some of the
questions raised by Olsen and Richardson, among which the controversy about the human
capital versus the friction approach to evaluation of the production gain, the asymmetry in
evaluation of treatments depending on whether the patients are active in the labor market
or retired, and Þnally the equality-efÞciency trade-off in health economic priority setting.
Since the point of the present paper is that health economic evaluations are by nature
relative (to an underlying criterion for what is good or bad for society) our conclusions
cannot have the nature of precise recommendations; what we can hope for is a clariÞcation
of which evaluation methods are consistent with the way of measuring other economic
effects and which are not. Among the latter is the so-called friction approach according to
which the production gain should be evaluated in what economists call shadow prices (the
cost for society of having the labor service performed); this method would indeed make
sense if everything else was measured in this way Ð but it is not and could hardly be, and
therefore, the isolated measuring of one out of many goods and services in shadow prices
is an inconsistency.
The argumentation in Olsen and Richardson (1999) that only part of the production
gain represents relevant gain to the rest of society, an argument which seems to be
based on the idea that the patientÕs gain is already counted in the health dimension and
therefore only part of the production gain should be included, is also hard to connect with
the theoretical background. If a medical treatment results in a larger labor supply actually
used in society, then there is a production gain for society, and it does not matter at all
where this labor supply actually came from, whether it was from the patients themselves,
their families or for that reason from total strangers.
With respect to the equality-efÞciency trade-off, which certainly is an important issue
in health economics, what we get from making explicit the theoretical foundations of
cost-effectiveness is the insight that an economic evaluation does not necessarily capture
all relevant aspects of societyÕs preferences with respect to new treatments or drugs; it
does not even attempt to do so. What it tries to achieve is to show how society would
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evaluate a given medical technology given that it uses the norms and priorities that
are revealed by the actual choices of society’s citizens. It goes without saying that the
results of cost-effectiveness analyses should be used with corresponding restraint: They
show at best the priorities in society evaluated according to the preferences which are used
in day-to-day economic decisions.
2. The welfare economic foundations of cost-beneÞt analysis
In this section, we give a short overview of the economic theory of project evaluation,
which lies behind economic appraisals of treatments or medicine. The basic idea behind
the economic appraisals is quite simple and can be outlined in a few lines: Assume that
a function f : Rk ! R is maximized at x0 subject to a constraint x 2 A ‰ Rk. If the
solution x0 is given a small displacement dx, made possible by a change in the feasible
set A, we can evaluate the effect on the objective function by computing
kX
h=1
f 0hdxh;
where f 0h is the partial derivative of f w.r.t. xh, evaluated at x
0. This method of evaluation
is useful even if we do not know the exact functional form of f , as long as we have access
to information about the partial derivatives from some other source, and in the context of
economic evaluations, we have this kind of information in the form of the market prices.
Now we turn to elaborating this basic idea in the context of allocation in a society.
In this and the following sections, we assume that (1) social welfare depends only on
the utility levels of the individuals, and (2) utility of any individual depends only on the
consumption of the available commodities (in other words, health carries no value per
se and is valuable only by making it possible to obtain a higher level of consumption).
Following Sen, we use the term consumerism for this setup. While (1) is rather standard
in economic welfare theory, also in its relation to health economics, assumption (2) may
seemmore doubtful, but even so it is common enough in the literature (as e.g., in Grossman
(1971)).
The theoretical approach to cost-beneÞt analysis, as developed by e.g. Lessourne
(1975), can now be described as follows: Assume that societyÕs consumption and
production is given by (x1; : : : ; xm) and (y1; : : : ; yn), where for i = 1; : : : ;m, xi is a
consumption bundle (of the l available commodities) of consumer i, and for j = 1; : : : ; n,
yj is a vector of net production of each of the l commodities in Þrm j. By (1), societyÕs
welfare can be measured as
S(u1(x1); : : : ; um(xm));
where S : Rm ! R is a social welfare function, and ui : Rl+ ! R, for i = 1; : : : ;m,
are the individual utility functions (which by (2) depend only on the achieved levels
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of consumption xi. We assume that both S and each of the individual utilities ui are
differentiable.
If the allocation in society is changed by some small amount dxi = (dxih)lh=1,
i = 1; : : : ;m, for each consumer, and dyj , j = 1; : : : ; n for the producers, then societyÕs
welfare changes by
dS =
mX
i=1
S0i
lX
h=1
u0ih(xi)dxih: (1)
Here, S0i is the societyÕs marginal welfare with respect to individual i, and u
0
ih is the
marginal utility of individual i for commodity h. The latter quantity is generally unknown
to the analyst, so in order to get along, one has to make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. In the initial allocation, consumers obtain their bundles by trading in
the market.
The assumption says that there is some price vector p 2 Rl+ such that for each i, the
consumption bundle xi maximizes ui on all x0i satisfying the budget constraint
p ¢ x0i • p ¢ xi = wi;
where we have introduced the notation wi for the total budget or income of consumer i,
i = 1; : : : ;m. Letting »i(p; wi) be the demand function of consumer i (which will be
assumed differentiable), we introduce the indirect utility function vi of consumer i by
vi(p; wi) = ui(»i(p; wi)).
We now have:
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, the change in social welfare may be written as
dS =
mX
i=1
S0i
lX
h=1
‚iu
0
ihdxih; (2)
where
‚i =
@vi(p; wi)
@wi
is the marginal utility of income for consumer i.
Proof: From standard textbook results, see e.g., Green, MasColell and Whinston (1993),
we have that the necessary conditions for maximum of ui(x0i) under the budget constraints
p ¢ x0i • wi (assuming an interior solution) are
u0ih = ‚iph; h = 1; : : : ; l;
where ‚i is the Lagrangian multiplier of the constrained maximization problem. The last
statement of the lemma is found by direct computation,
@vi(p; wi)
@wi
=
lX
h=1
u0ih
@»ih
@wi
=
lX
h=1
‚iph
@»ih
@wi
;
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where
lX
h=1
‚iph
@»ih
@wi
= 1
as can be seen by differentiating the budget equation
Pl
h=1 ph»ih(p; wi) = wiwith respect
to wi.
With the expression (2) we got rid of the unknown terms u0ih but we have got the
new terms ‚i, the interpretation of which is given by Lemma 1, but which still are not
easily assessed from the data of the problem. To circumvent this problem, we need another
assumption:
Assumption 2. The distribution of incomes sustaining the consumptions at the initial
allocation is optimal measured by the social welfare function.
What Assumption 2 states is that the incomes wi, i = 1; : : : ;m, which entered into
the individual consumerÕs utility maximization problems above, cannot be redistributed in
such a way that societyÕs welfare increases, or, otherwise put, (w1; : : : ; wm) maximizes
S(v1(p; w01); : : : ; vm(p; w
0
m)) on all (w
0
1; : : : ; w
0
m) with
w01 + ¢ ¢ ¢+ w0m = w1 + ¢ ¢ ¢+ wm:
Necessary conditions for maximum gives
S0i
@vi
@wi
= „; i = 1; : : : ;m
where „ is a (positive) Lagrange multiplier, and we may now rewrite (2) as
dS = „
lX
h=1
ph
mX
i=1
dxih:
We summarize our Þndings in the following:
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the change in social welfare has the form
dS = „
lX
h=1
ph
mX
i=1
dxih: (3)
This expression may be used for evaluation purposes: If the value at the prices p of
the aggregate changes in consumption
Pm
i=1 dxi is positive, then by (3) societyÕs welfare
increases, and if p ¢Pmi=1 dxi is negative, then societyÕs welfare will decrease. Thus, we
have a criterion for assessing the gain or losses of society of any displacement of the initial
allocation.
However, for practical purposes it is usually inconvenient to check the consumption
changes of each and every individual in society; it is much easier to check the changes in
production. Fortunately, since only aggregate displacements matter, it almost amounts to
the same thing. Formally, however, we need a Þnal assumption (of a closed economy):
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Assumption 3. The change in aggregate consumption equals the change in aggregate
production.
Formally, this means that
Pm
i=1 dxi =
Pn
j=1 dyj . Inserting in (3), we get the
expression
dS = „
lX
h=1
ph
nX
j=1
dyjh;
which can be used to check societyÕs gain or loss from a change of allocation.
We state the result of our considerations in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Assume that the economy is initially at the allocation (x1; : : : ; xm;
y1; : : : ; yn) and that this allocation is subjected to a displacement (dx1; : : : ; dxm;
dy1; : : : ; dyn). Under Assumptions 1 Ð 3, the displacement is an improvement for society
according to the social welfare function S if and only if
dS = „
lX
h=1
ph
nX
j=1
dyjh > 0: (4)
The derivation above is a rather standard application of the general economic welfare
theory and it can be found in the literature (e.g. Lessourne (1975)). It gives the theoretical
background for project evaluation or cost-beneÞt analysis; it is however surprisingly little
used in the health economic literature, where it can shed light on some of the controversies
connected with the treatment of indirect costs in health economic appraisals.
3. Production gains: the human-capital and friction methods
In the previous section, we have assumed that all available commodities enter into the
consumption of any consumer Ð or, more speciÞcally, the consumption of each and
every commodity enters into the utility function of each consumer. In practice, some
commodities are intermediate, which means that they are made available for producers
who use them as input while producing other commodities, and only the end products are
used directly by the consumers.
Clearly, the arguments of the present section carry over without problems; the level
of consumption of each intermediate good stays at 0 throughout the investigation, so it is
immaterial whether or not the consumer would be able to buy such goods in the market
(which, according to our Assumption 1, should be the case). We may consequently
consider our Assumption 1 to pertain only to such commodities which do enter into the
utility functions of the consumers. This means, among other things, that the evaluation
based on the displacement of the consumption carried out by the individuals can be carried
through also in the case where the initial allocation is not efÞcient (so that there is no
system of efÞciency prices on all commodities) but where the consumption side of the
economy is still sustained by prices in the sense of Assumption 1.
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However, for the replacement of consumption by production data, the prices on the
intermediate goods matter. The equality of the values of aggregate consumption and
production displacements will hold true only if the production prices are meaningful. We
summarize these considerations in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume that the economy is initially at the allocation (x1; : : : ; xm;
y1; : : : ; yn) and that this allocation is subjected to a displacement (dx1; : : : ; dxm;
dy1; : : : ; dyn). Assume that the individual utility functions ui depend only on consumption
of the Þrst k < l commodities, that Assumption 1 is fulÞlled with respect to the commodities
h = 1; : : : ; k, and that Assumptions 2 and 3 are fulÞlled.
Then the social desirability of the displacement may be evaluated by the criterion
dS = „
lX
h=1
ph
nX
j=1
dyjh
if and only if the production prices reßect the value of the consumption displacement, that
is iff
Pl
h=1 ph
Pn
j=1 dyjh =
Pk
h=1 ph
Pm
i=1 dxih:
The proposition, which is a straightforward consequence of the deÞnitions, is stated
in detail since it sheds light on a famous controversy in the debate about cost-effectiveness
analyses, that of evaluating the so-called production gain. This production gain arises as
the result of a treatment, if the patient may return to productive work sooner than without
the treatment and thus produces a beneÞt for society (often referred to as an indirect beneÞt
to distinguish from the direct beneÞts in terms of improved health or quality of life). If the
effect of a new treatment is evaluated from the production side, which indeed is the usual
or rather the only feasible way of evaluating displacements in allocation, then (assuming
that work has no utility per se) this additional work is an intermediate good and as such it
is not covered by Assumption 1, at least in its relaxed version.
Since there are usually no obvious counterparts of (more or less) free markets for
consumption goods pertaining to labor markets, the question arises of how to evaluate
the above mentioned production gain. In the literature, two quite different methods are
proposed: (1) the human capital approach amounts to using the actual wages paid in the
labor market for the type of work in question, and (2) the friction method, according to
which the production gain should be evaluated as replacement cost, the cost for society
of obtaining the appropriate replacement for the person who has gone out of work due to
illness. The differences in indirect beneÞts calculated according to the two methods are
quite signiÞcant, so it does matter which one is used.
The proposition above gives us an answer to this: The evaluation of the production
gain should be in prices which reßect the value of the additional consumption goods
produced (in the market prices for consumption goods). In the friction method, labor
services are measured in shadow prices (which are low if there are idle resources of labor),
and if all the remaining prices are alsomeasured in such true shadowprices (so that the price
of each and any commodity reßects what it would cost society to provide one more unit),
then all iswell and the frictionmethod is the right one. Usually, the prices onordinary goods
which can be observed are not scarcity or shadow prices, and then the friction method
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runs into an inconsistency. What happens is essentially the following: If the production
gain should be measured in shadow prices of labor, then all the other displacements should
similarly be measured in these prices according to their labor content (since ÒtrueÓ labor
costs are much smaller than nominal costs), meaning that also the direct costs (of medicin,
treatment etc.) should be reduced, unfortunately in a way which is largely unknown since
the true scarcity costs of the commodities are not revealed by the market.
The fact that the friction method is not theoretically founded does not mean that
the human capital method is correct. The crucial point is whether or not the prices on
intermediate products, and among these the price of labor services, are such that the
change in aggregate production reßects the change in aggregate consumption. The actual
wages paid may not have this property; however, in one particular case, namely if all prices
are competitive, meaning that the initial allocation is a market equilibrium at the prices
p1; : : : ; pl, the human capital method is exactly the right one. Otherwise put, if one is
willing to accept the initial allocation together with the price and wage structure observed
and used in a cost-effectiveness analysis as a good approximation to an equilibrium of the
market mechanism, then the human capital method does the right thing.
4. The foundation of cost-effectiveness analysis
Assume now that social welfare depends not only on achieved consumption levels, but
also on certain health parameters of the individuals, so that the social welfare function has
the form
S(h1; : : : ; hm; u1(x1); : : : ; um(xm));
where hi is a real number, an indicator of the health level of individual i. In this context,
the analysis of section 1 must be slightly modiÞed: A project is now described not only by
its consequences on consumption, dx1; : : : ; dxm, but also by the changes dh1; : : : ; dhm
in the health status of each individual which it gives rise to. With this modiÞcation, the
change in social welfare is
dS =
mX
i=1
@S
@hi
dhi +
mX
i=1
@S
@ui
lX
h=1
u0ihdxih:
Proceeding as before (under Assumptions 1 Ð 3), we get the expression
dS =
mX
i=1
@S
@hi
dhi + „
lX
h=1
ph
nX
j=1
dyjh; (5)
thus, the effects of the changes in allocation of ordinary commodities may (as previously)
be evaluated by the change in aggregate value of (net) production. Unfortunately, (5) still
contains the unobservable quantities @S=@hi, for i = 1; : : : ;m.
To get further beyond this point, we need further assumptions; an obvious Þrst one is
the counterpart of Assumption 2 with respect to the health status variables:
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Assumption 4. Health is optimally distributed initially, that is,
@S
@h1
= ¢ ¢ ¢ = @S
@hm
= H > 0:
We remark that Assumption 4 might be more problematic than Assumption 2 since
we have not speciÞed a mechanism for redistributing health in society.
Using Assumption 4, we get that welfare gains for society can be expressed as
dS = H
mX
i=1
dhi + „
lX
h=1
ph
nX
j=1
dyjh: (6)
Thus, welfare gains of society may be assessed as a weighted sum of the health gains and
the changes in value of net production.
The two members of the right hand side correspond to the outcome and the cost
side of a traditional cost-effectiveness analysis. However, the apparent cornerstone of
cost-effectiveness analysis, the cost-effectiveness ratio, has been replaced by a weighted
sum. And what is even worse, the weights, even the relative weights, are generally
unknown, being societyÕs marginal rate of substitution between health and consumption-
related utility.
Thus, so far we have obtained that project evaluation may be reduced to evaluation
of pairs (dh; dy) with
dh =
mX
i=1
dhi; dy =
lX
h=1
ph
nX
j=1
dyjh: (7)
According to (6), pairs (dh; dy) are ordered according to a linear criterion with unknown
weights.
As long as the weights remain unknown, there is no simple criterion (comparable to
(4) above) for deciding whether society gains or not from the project under consideration.
However, a comparison between different projects may still be possible, at least under the
additional assumption of scale invariance.
Proposition 3. If two projects are given by displacements in health parameters
dhi1; : : : ; dh
i
m together with consumption and production displacements dx
i
1; : : : ; dx
i
m;
dyi1; : : : ; dy
i
n, for i = 1; 2, from a given allocation (x1; : : : ; xm; y1; : : : ; yn), then under
Assumptions 1 Ð 4 project 1 is at least as good for society as project 2 in the sense that
S(h1 + tdh11; : : : ; hm + tdh
1
m; u1(x1 + tdx
1
1); : : : ; um(xm + tdx
1
m))
‚ S(h1 + dh21; : : : ; hm + dh2m; u1(x1 + dx21); : : : ; um(xm + dx2m))
for some t > 0 iff Pm
i=1 dh
1
iPl
h=1 ph
Pn
j=1 dy
1
jh
‚
Pm
i=1 dh
2
iPl
h=1 ph
Pn
j=1 dy
2
jh
(8)
(that is project 1 yields at least as much health per dollar as project 2).
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Proof: The comparison of project 1 and 2 amounts to comparing the two pairs (dh1; dy1),
(dh2; dy2) written according to (7); for small enough displacements (technically, for
(dhi; dyi) going to 0, we get from (6) that dS1 ‚ dS2 if and only if (8) holds.
Proposition 3 gives the theoretical foundation for the celebrated cost-effectiveness
ratio used widely in the literature. It should be stressed that the comparison according
to cost-effectiveness ratios is less simple than what is usually assumed; projects are not
compared directly, rather some (scaled) version of one project is compared to the other
one. As a result, computing cost-effectiveness ratios does not directly answer the question
whether one treatment is socially preferable to another (evengivenour assumptions); it does
so only if the projects may be scaled arbitrarily. Unfortunately, this is very rarely the case;
treatments can usually not be limited to a smaller class of patients than those suffering
from the relevant disease, and even more obviously, they cannot be scaled upwards to
include more patients than are actually available. This is a price which must be paid in
order to compare two-dimensional vectors (given by effects in terms of aggregate health
and by cost) without knowledge of societyÕs weights upon each of the variables.
5. Cost-utility analysis and the problem of interpersonal comparisons
In the previous section, we assumed throughout that the health variable of the individual
was a one-dimensional quantity. This, unfortunately, does not Þt very well with real life,
where health and displacement of health have several aspects which should be taken into
consideration in an analysis of a new medical technology.
If individual health is measured as a vector hi = (hi1; : : : ; hir) of different attributes
of health, then the formalism in the previous section changes slightly; the change in
social welfare S(h1; : : : ; hm; u1(x1); : : : ; um(xm)) caused by displacements in health
dh1; : : : ; dhm and in consumption dx1; : : : ; dxm should now be evaluated as
dS =
mX
i=1
rX
k=1
@S
@hik
dhik +
mX
i=1
@S
@ui
lX
h=1
u0ihdxih:
In order to proceed, we need Assumption 1 Ð 3, so that the last member on the right hand
side may be replaced by „
Pl
h=1 ph
Pn
j=1 dyjh, and assumptions pertaining to health
variables allowing us to perform the same kind of reduction. Here we have a problem,
however; it might be acceptable to assume that each of the different aspects of health is
distributed optimally at the outset, so that
@S
@h1k
= ¢ ¢ ¢ = @S
@hmk
= Hk
for k 2 f1; : : : ; rg, but this still leaves us with r different variables, one for each of the
relevant aspects of health.
In the literature, this problem has been taken care of by using indices for health
which performs a consolidation of individual health variables into an index of overall
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health (or rather, quality of life), that is a rule I which transforms individual health status
(hi1; : : : ; hir) into a single variable Ii = I(hi1; : : : ; hir). Assuming the existence of such
a rule Ð and that social welfare depends on individual health only through the index values
Ð we now get that the change in social welfare has the form
dS =
mX
i=1
@S
@Ii
dIi + „
lX
h=1
ph
nX
j=1
dyjh;
where @S=@Ii denotes the marginal social welfare of an increase in the health index value
of individual i. This expression still does not give us a cost-utility ratio criterion; we need
the usual assumption of socially optimal distribution of health as measured by the health
index:
Assumption 5. Health as expressed by the health index I is optimally distributed initially,
that is,
@S
@I1
= ¢ ¢ ¢ = @S
@Im
= H > 0:
With Assumption 5 added to the our assumptions, we have the obvious counterpart
of Proposition 3:
Proposition 4. If two projects are given by displacements in the value of the
health index dIi1; : : : ; dI
i
m together with consumption and production displacements
dxi1; : : : ; dx
i
m; dy
i
1; : : : ; dy
i
n, for i = 1; 2 fromagivenallocation (x1; : : : ; xm; y1; : : : ; yn),
then under Assumptions 1 Ð 3 and 5 project 1 is at least as good for society as project 2 in
the sense that
S(h1 + tdh11; : : : ; hm + tdh
1
m; u1(x1 + tdx
1
1); : : : ; um(xm + tdx
1
m))
‚ S(h1 + dh21; : : : ; hm + dh2m; u1(x1 + dx21); : : : ; um(xm + dx2m))
for some t > 0 iff Pm
i=1 dI
1
iPl
h=1 ph
Pn
j=1 dy
1
jh
‚
Pm
i=1 dI
2
iPl
h=1 ph
Pn
j=1 dy
2
jh
: (9)
While the result of Proposition 4 formally supports the use of cost-utility analyses
in the literature, its assumptions are stronger than those made in the previous sections.
The assumption about equality of marginal social welfare with respect to individual health
index values is easy to formulate but not quite as easy to interpret. If individual i obtains
a change in health characteristics dhi = (dhi1; : : : ; dhir), then the index changes by
dI =
rX
k=1
I 0kdhik;
where I 0k is the partial derivative of the index w.r.t. the kth health variable. By Assumption
5, all the displacements dhi such that the weighted sum
Pr
k=1 I
0
kdhik is the same will
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give rise to exactly the same change in social welfare, meaning that locally the index is
obtained as a weighted sum (with weights I 0k) of the displacements in each health variable.
Since the weights depend only on the health variables and not on the individuals, we have
implicitly assumed that all individuals evaluate the difierent aspects of health in the
same way.
While there can be little doubt that an assumption of this type is necessary in order
to reduce a multidimensional problem to one with a single or at most two variables,
it still remains quite strong. When dealing with the economic variables (consumption or
production of the many different commodities) we, have, at least in principle, a mechanism
which works in the direction of equalizing the weights by which these quantities are
aggregated, namely the market. There is no such counterpart for the health variables (for
an investigation along these lines, see Hougaard and Keiding, 1999) , so Assumption 4
remains a postulate without theoretical foundation or even a plausible intuitive foundation.
Therefore, the result of Proposition 4 is of much less value than that of the previous section.
6. Production gains in cost-effectiveness analysis with explicit health variables
Having now discussed the foundations of cost-effectiveness and cost-utility analyses, we
may return to the main theme, which was the evaluation of production gains. In the Þrst
approach, where health variables were assumed away, we saw that production entered only
by replacement Ð the production gain was a simple way of approaching the gain in utility
of consumption obtained by additional production.
The inclusion of health variables does not change this story, but it adds a further
dimension to the problem; more speciÞcally, Assumption 3 may not be quite reasonable
since the production efforts in society could be directed towards health rather than
commodities for consumption, so that aggregate consumption no longer corresponds to
what is available in endowment or through production. The question arising in this case
is whether in an evaluation which uses data from the production side of the economy we
may run a risk of double-counting by including both the health gain and the production
gain.
The advantage of having a formal model is that such questions may be answered
unambiguously without appeal to plausible ad-hoc arguments. What matters in our model
is the change in social welfare, which again is triggered by changes in individual health
variables and in (utility of) consumption. Indeed, from the previous sections we know that
what we look for can be expressed as
dS =
mX
i=1
rX
k=1
@S
@hik
dhik + „
lX
h=1
ph
mX
i=1
dxih;
and if Assumption 3 Ð which states that changes in the aggregate consumption of any of the
marketed goods must correspond to a change in aggregate net production of this good Ð we
may still substitute
Pl
h=1 ph
Pn
j=1 dyjh for
Pl
h=1 ph
Pm
i=1 dxih. Nothing has changed
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by adding special health variables; as previously, the Òproduction gainÓ is only a proxy for
the increased amount of consumption goods which are made available for the population
as a whole. In particular, there is no need to distinguish between patients who are net
contributors and those who are net recipients and then evaluate the net production gain for
each type (as proposed in Olsen and Richardson, 1999). Cost-effectiveness analysis and
the concepts used in it all relate to society as a whole, and any assignment of gain and
losses to single individuals is arbitrary.
Since the addition of non-economic ÒgoodsÓ or variables to the analysis does not
change the approach, it might be tempting to reduce this case to the Þrst one, treating
the health variables as ordinary economic commodities for which there happens to be no
markets (the particular features of health being individual and not exchangable have been
abstracted from anyway by e.g. Assumption 5). In order to formulate this as a Þnal result,
we need to introduce some further structure on the problem. We assume that there is
some connection between the health enjoyed by the individuals and the consumption and
production carried out in the economy, described by the equation
'(I(h1); : : : ; I(hm); x1; : : : ; xm; y1; : : : ; yn) = 0;
where ' is a differentiable function, which gives the trade-off between economic activity
and health. We have assumed that this trade-off depends only on the value of the health
index discussed in the previous section; this assumption is, as we noted, not realistic, but
since the additional assumptions are much worse in this respect, we have chosen it for
simplicity of exposition.
Now we state a Þnal assumption, which formally allows us to put a money value on
a unit of the health index:
Assumption 6. The initial allocation and the achieved levels of health (I1; : : : ; Im) are
socially optimal in the sense that there is no alternative way of producing and consuming
in society so that overall social welfare, when health is taken into consideration, is greater.
Proposition 5. Assume that the economy is initially at the allocation (x1; : : : ; xm;
y1; : : : ; yn) and that its individuals enjoy levels I1; : : : ; Im of the health index. If this allo-
cation is subjected to displacements (dx1; : : : ; dxm; dy1; : : : ; dyn) and (dh1; : : : ; dhm),
then under Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 Ð 6, there is a numberQ > 0 such that these displace-
ments represent an improvement for society according to the social welfare function S if
and only if
Q
mX
i=1
dIi +
lX
h=1
ph
nX
j=1
dyjh ‚ 0: (10)
Proof: ByAssumption 6, the social welfare is maximized at the given allocation (including
the health variables) under the additional constraint
'(I(h1); : : : ; I(hm); x1; : : : ; xm; y1; : : : ; yn) = 0;
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and from the Þrst order conditions for constrained maximum we get that
@S
@Ii
= ”
@'
@Ii
; all i;
@S
@ui
@ui
@xih
= ”
@'
@xih
+ ¿h; all i and h
¿h = ”
@'
@yjh
; all j and h
from which we get (using Assumptions 1, 2, and 5) that
H
„ph
=
µ
@S
@ui
¶¡1
@S
@Ii
=
µ
@'
@xih
+
@'
@yjh
¶¡1
@'
@Ii
for each commodity h 2 f1; : : : ; lg, showing that the marginal rate of substitution for
society between aggregate health and consumption of commodity h has the magnitude
H=„ph.
Let Q = H=„, so that
Q
ph
=
µ
@S
@ui
¶¡1
@S
@Ii
:
Then the change in social utility associated with the displacements (dx1; : : : ; dxm;
dy1; : : : ; dyn) in allocation and (dh1; : : : ; dhm) in health may be evaluated as
dS =
mX
i=1
@S
@Ii
dIi + „
lX
h=1
ph
mX
i=1
dxih = „
"
Q
mX
i=1
dIi +
lX
h=1
ph
mX
i=1
dxih
#
;
and using Assumption 3, we Þnally get that
dS = „
24Q mX
i=1
dIi +
lX
h=1
ph
nX
j=1
dyjh
35 ;
showing that the sign of dS is positive if and only if (10) holds.
The result in Proposition 5 may be seen as a theoretical basis for cost-beneÞt analyses
in problems involving health variables. Unfortunately, it has as yet little or no practical
applicability; it states that there exists a correct Òdollar per QALYÓ value which may be
used in economic appraisals, but it gives no clue to the problem of Þnding this value. This
should come as no surprise; it is just another way of stating that Assumption 6 may or
may not be satisÞed, but that we cannot point to an institutional framework inside which
the assumption would be fulÞlled as a result of the economic behavior of individuals or
groups of individuals.
It might be noticed that Assumption 6 together with Assumption 1 tells us that we
have an equilibrium where the prices paid by the consumers in the market reßect the true
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cost of society, even though we in the formulation of the health production relationship
have opened up for ÒindirectÓ production of health via the individual consumptions. This
shows once more that the result uses too restrictive assumptions to be of much practical
use.
7. Concluding comments
In the present paper, we have considered the welfare theoretical basis for economic
appraisals of drugs and treatments, with a special regard to the role of the so-called indirect
costs, and in particular to the production gain. We found that this production gain enters
because the change in allocation is easier to trace on the production side of the economy
than by checking all individual consumption bundles. What matters is the change in health
and consumption, the change in production is only of secondary importance. This insight
helps us to understand why the so-called frictional method of evaluating the production
does not work: The prices used should be the prices at which the individuals actually trade,
so that they reßect the marginal rate of substitutions of the consumers. Shadow prices in
the labor market do not reßect market choices; it might be argued that neither does the
nominal wages, and this is correct, but the difference is much smaller.
The basic idea of our analysis has been to make precise the formal model in which
we argue, so that practical rules of evaluation may be deduced from a few basic principles
rather than argued on general considerations of intuition or consensus among experts. In
order for such an approach to be succesfull, themodel should be sufÞcientlywell developed
to capture all essential aspects of the situation, in our case economic appraisals of medicine
and of medical treatments. In its present version, our model still has some limitations,
among which the absence of externalities, which certainly are an important feature of
health economics, in particular when societyÕs evaluation of alternative technologies are
involved. A model incorporating this and yielding conclusions as to the proper way of
handling such externalities will remain a topic of future research.
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